By modern standards, earlier theological quibbles would have been ill-understood. The Mu’tazilite persecution of theological rivals during the mihna (Inquisition) seems almost incomprehensible, for it would appear that such abstruse and arcane discourse would have nothing to do with political life, far less for sustaining power. And yet, historically theology has always enjoyed a love-hate relationship with the state. This becomes more understood when we analyze how a more politicized form of Islam gradually gains support in the modern world, and why, for example, an ‘Islam’ that is wedded to political ideology or indeed ideological Islam in its many forms becomes so popular amongst the disenfranchised and dispossessed segment of the Muslim community.
Islam’s negotiation with modernity is represented by two prototypical strands found in its early history, namely in the debate between the famous theologian, jurist and Sufi, Harith al-Muhasibi, and the theologian-jurist, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, on the most appropriate response to the Mu’tazilite heresy of the time. Both agreed that Mu’tazilism, which was born of early Muslim encounter with Greek and Hellenistic philosophy, was a serious challenge to Islamic orthodoxy. Yet they disagreed as to how best to deal with it. Muhasibi’s response was to produce a lengthy intellectual refutation of their claims, which naturally included an objective and fair assessment of the Mu’tazilite positions in their own terms. This infuriated Ibn Hanbal, who argued that such refutations could well serve more harm than good. Most Muslims, he reasoned, were hardly aware of such heresies, and indeed, would probably come to knowledge of them precisely because they come across such ‘refutations’. They would therefore pass from innocence and simplicity to great theological confusion when they suddenly come to know about them. This is all the more plausible given the possibility that they might in fact end up being persuaded by the heresies than by the refutations. Add to this is another likelihood that they might read the heresies without reading the refutations. All these considerations, Ibn Hanbal maintained, point to the merit of keeping the general public out of such knowledge and insist instead, on the value of piety and faith which is reflective of the way of the pious predecessors (salaf), the first three generations of Muslims. Eventually however, subsequent scholars recognize the merit of both and acknowledge the need for pious fidelity to belief, but Muhasibi’s approach prevailed insofar it was the most realistically responsive towards ever-growing challenge to belief. The other strand fell into dispopularity, yet was later hijacked by fringe theologico-political movements for their own sinister agenda.
Caution, however, need to be made against identifying this strand as “Wahhabism” or any such titles. Notwithstanding the fact that certain authors continue to inspire this deformist movements, to leave this as it is would surrender this interpretation to their monopoly. The strategy, therefore, is to incorporate these writings and subject them to a multiplicity of readings and alternative hermeneutics or interpretation, vindicated, no doubt, by systematic logical and rational scrutiny. The science of logic, for example, has always been an integral aspect of traditional Islamic religious education, but especially so for scholastic theology (‘ilm al-kalam). Yet a severely truncated reading and misinterpretation of such works as Ibn Taymiyyahs’ Refutation of the Logicians (radd ‘ala al-mantiqiyyun) have led subsequent ‘thinkers’ (or rather, ‘tinkerers’) to denounce logic as ‘deviant innovation’ (bid’ah).
Furthermore, it is also recommended that more relevant works be translated into Arabic, for it is true that in such cultures, they are deprived of a large body of literature that would have altered their perception towards things, confined, as they are, with the exclusively “religious”—a fate that wouldn’t have befallen them had there been a substantial component of spirituality, traditionally served by Sufism, which they nevertheless negate as dubious innovation.
The virulent hate for other religions and civilisations as displayed in some of their literature should be replaced with more sober and compassionate accounts. There should be more engagement with this people. Part of this deformist and totalitarian theology involves rabid contempt and hatred for Sufis, Sufism and all things Sufi. Personal spiritual experiences are deemed illegitimate and void unless there is an explicit text that warrants it. By sapping away all personal spiritual strength, this theology renders the individual’s religious and spiritual experiences subservient to the mercy of religious theocrats. Any attempt to understand the meaning of the Qur’an or hadith is deemed illegitimate because the minds of mortals are ill-equipped to understand it.
One may think that theology has little to do with politics despite the fact that historically, there has been close relationship between the two. Most people who look at things in the past simply jump to the conclusion that they were just politicizing religion. This is partially true for the more pressing question is, how is it that religion can be politicized? In fact all of them are inter-related: politics, religion, theology and even psychology. Theologically, by removing all traces of rational inquiry from the realm of religious thought, this in effect has a deleteriously paralyzing effect on the intellect. We no longer trust our own God-given intellect to make judgments for ourselves.
They seem to think that the best of servants are those who follow God’s Word are those who follow without thinking or asking. This line of reasoning was completely false.By discarding logic and its attendant discipline, scholastic theology (‘ilm al-kalam) which is thoroughly infused with philosophical discourse, one’s intellect is severely crippled when it comes to knowledge about religion, by denying ordinary believers of any say regarding religion, maintaining that it is the exclusive prerogative of the ‘ulama by appealing to the hadith that the one who interprets the Qur’an in accordance with his own opinion will assure his place in the hellfire. Explaining this hadith, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, the greatest theologian of Sunni Islam, maintained that what was meant by it is not that one cannot say anything, but rather to ‘justify’ one’s already held assumptions by quoting verses of the Quran.
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